Explore 100 judgments by topic or search by concept, number, ECLI or year. This selection covers different years, including 2026. Each original note identifies its official source and explains the decision’s limits.
100 judgments shown
A time limit was upheld on a prospective assessment of work history, income and realistic opportunities to overcome the imbalance. The court also considered the earlier period of separation and financial dependence without automatically equating it with marital cohabitation.
The case was remitted for the surname dispute to be decided after hearing the parties. Establishing parentage and ordering a generic registry correction did not justify excluding an issue connected with the child’s name and interests.
The court distinguished possession under co-ownership and usufruct from exclusive possession as owner. Managing land or paying expenses did not, in this case, establish unequivocal exclusion of the other owners sufficient to acquire the entire property by adverse possession.
The Supreme Court upheld protection of descendants’ reserved shares against an arrangement benefiting the surviving spouse as an initial heir. The will could not freely postpone the children’s enjoyment of the improvement share on the disputed terms.
The court recognised shared custody where ordinary residence and care were substantially equal in practice. The formal label of maternal custody could not override the actual substance of the arrangements.
The court allowed certain maintenance payments made by grandparents for grandchildren to be brought into the estate accounting for the benefit received by the obligated father. In that case he could meet the obligation, and a prior judgment quantifying maintenance was not required.
The court set aside the contact decision for insufficient reasons concerning suspension and the position after the sentences. It required attention to the daughters’ interests and hearing, explaining that article 94 concerns the protected interests rather than merely the offence’s title.
The court found inadequate reasoning about a clause reducing an entitlement to the strict reserved share in specified challenges. In interpreting it, the court distinguished that arrangement from prohibiting access to court to challenge legally invalid provisions.
The court corrected the temporal effects given to maintenance not claimed in the application. This measure requires a party’s request, and effects could not be preserved for an award that should not have been made on the court’s own initiative.
The court set aside conversion of indefinite maintenance into a two-year payment because no substantial change justified it. The employment and health circumstances examined did not support a reasoned forecast of financial independence within that period.
A temporary right to use the home was set after considering ownership, parental resources, schooling and the children’s specific needs. One child’s disability was assessed through its actual impact on care rather than automatically extending occupation.
The court treated particular acts as tacit acceptance of the widow’s entitlement. Since those assets entered her estate, the fractional legatee was entitled to participate in the liquidation affecting her property.
A father’s wish for contact did not offset established breaches involving exposure to violence, failures of care and emotional harm. The daughter’s interests required stronger protection.
Shared custody was rejected following a conviction for abusive conduct and in the absence of parental cooperation. The arrangement requires commitment and respect beyond dividing residence time.
Repayment was refused for maintenance paid while the judgment maintaining it remained effective. The appeal decision ending payment because of financial changes had not ordered earlier effects.
The court distinguished substitution according to the portion of the estate. Under the will examined, the renounced strict reserved share passed to the other forced heirs, while substitute descendants received the specified improvement and freely disposable shares.
Death ended the reserved usufruct over the shares. Dividends subsequently received by the widow became a debt of her estate; heirs accepting with benefit of inventory were not personally liable from their separate assets.
Buyers paying value were protected when relying on the register showing the seller as sole owner. Knowing that he was divorced did not itself defeat good faith or require investigation of every possible unregistered matrimonial interest.
Continued occupation without a time limit after the daughter reached adulthood was corrected. Linking it to an uncertain liquidation process was rejected, and a six-month transition was granted on the facts.
Recognition was examined under the 2007 Hague Convention. The court found neither incompatibility with later Spanish interim measures nor denial of defence; the capitalised maintenance award was justified by the children’s needs and established non-compliance.
The court upheld invalidity of a partition conducted in bad faith and harming an intentionally omitted forced heir. The preference for preserving partitions does not prevent invalidity when no adequate alternative exists.
A procedural challenge did not neutralise a divorce agreement clause closing the allocations and waiving later claims. No substantive grounds against its validity and effect had been advanced.
Ownership-related expenses paid by one former spouse before liquidation had to enter the relevant liabilities. The obligation follows ownership rather than simply who occupies the property.
The court distinguished a testator’s own partition from one made by an appointed partitioner. The latter may be rescinded for loss exceeding one quarter, and the case was remitted to assess the alleged loss.
A father’s transfer of assets to his daughter in return for care and companionship was upheld as an onerous support contract. Personal and emotional care could form the consideration, distinct from statutory family maintenance.
Fees for work in the common interest, not previously deducted from the estate, could be claimed from each heir in proportion to their share. The partitioner’s role is not simply that of an expert witness.
The increased amount awarded on appeal took effect from that judgment, while the initial award was payable from the application. Payments already made had to be deducted to avoid duplication.
The children were not held solely responsible for estrangement originating in a highly conflictual parental divorce. The father’s conduct and the children’s vulnerability mattered; lack of contact was not automatically a valid ground for disinheritance.
Knowing absence of a biological link did not itself invalidate recognition. The court examined its purpose, family life and benefit for the child, finding no fraud or breach of legal limits on the facts.
The Supreme Court rejected parents alternating in one home because agreement and sufficient resources were lacking. The merits of shared custody did not resolve those problems.
Repaying a personal loan used to buy the family home with community funds could create a proportional community interest, as with mortgage repayments. The economic purpose of the borrowing was decisive.
A husband’s liability for tax misconduct as a company director was not transferred to the matrimonial community. No benefit to that community from the conduct had been established.
Proceedings determining whether consent was required could not overturn a child-protection declaration or order family return outside the issues raised. The child’s protection also required a reasoned assessment.
Attachments over an entire common asset for one former spouse’s later separate debts did not justify inventoring a credit against that debtor. The appropriate remedy examined was a third-party ownership claim limiting attachment to the debtor’s abstract share.
The court balanced an incidental reference to a child in coverage focused on adults. With no new identifying details and the relevant matters already disclosed, it found no unlawful interference on those facts.
A co-owner enjoying agreed exclusive use could seek possession against a daughter occupying by permission. The other co-owner could not impose a ten-year free grant contrary to the peacefully accepted allocation.
The Supreme Court upheld maternal custody because the challenged judgment gave specific reasons against shared custody. Closure of the gender-based violence proceedings did not make shared custody compulsory.
For the action examined, knowledge of sufficient facts supporting possible paternity started the period. Waiting for biological certainty did not postpone it where those facts were already known.
A share belonging to a pending estate did not prevent another co-owner seeking division. The court preserved future beneficiaries’ rights and recalled the estate’s procedural capacity.
A custody request introduced after the application could be examined because it affected the child and had been debated. The appeal was remitted for decision, reflecting procedural flexibility in child-related proceedings.
Housing need could justify temporary occupation, but not preferential entitlement to the more convenient lot at liquidation. Statutory allocation rules applied, and common partitioner fees were not procedural costs.
When shared custody changed to maternal custody, the Supreme Court rejected backdating maintenance to the application where support had continued through alternating residence until the appeal decision.
Proceedings were set aside for significant defects in service on a defendant in Turkey. Post without an identified recipient and an email marked read did not establish effective notice and translated documents.
Heightened protection extended to violence in the children’s household even where the perpetrator was not their parent. Custody was awarded to the father on the established risks, with extensive maternal contact.
A private insurance claim framed as variation failed without reasons supporting a change. Claiming that sharing was already agreed required identifying the enforceable basis and procedure, not assuming a measure absent from the judgment.
The appeal decision was set aside for changing custody without hearing the daughter or explaining the omission. Her right had to be protected by the court regardless of the parents’ procedural positions.
Rotating use could be sought against a former spouse’s exclusive occupation despite expiry of enforcement of an earlier division through both parties’ inactivity. Seeking a solution to continuing co-ownership was neither waiver nor abuse.
Loss of the benefit was upheld for disloyal transactions reducing the value of a company whose shares formed the estate. Related companies did not shield self-benefiting acts harming estate assets.
On the facts, an empty liquidation process was not required. The party assuming the joint loan, with the bank releasing the other borrower, could claim the corresponding contribution without a presumed waiver.
A rule governing assets transferred to public authorities did not cancel the testator’s rental-distribution burden. The court distinguished dedication of an asset to public use from the specific testamentary obligation.
The father could act individually to protect the common home against a son without title whose conflictual occupation had forced him out. The wife’s support entity did not also have to sue, given its functions.
The court maintained contact with safeguards and judicial monitoring, considering current circumstances and uncertainty over the old criminal proceedings.
When liquidating community property before distributing an estate, the court upheld the community character of deposits whose alleged separate origin was unproved.
The court upheld changed living arrangements for an adult son by considering his current needs, wishes and both parents’ abilities. It also required notification to the court responsible for reviewing the former capacity measures.
The court maintained support: the daughter was not solely responsible for the damaged relationship and hostility was reciprocal. It also stressed that cassation does not permit unrestricted rewriting of established facts.
The Supreme Court corrected the classification of textbooks and tuition as extraordinary expenses because they form part of ordinary education. It maintained the treatment of the extracurricular activities examined because the asserted foreseeability had not been established.
The court allowed the superiority aggravator where circumstances supporting it were independent of the offence’s violence. Reasons had to identify that separate factual basis.
The court highlighted two requirements for evaluating messages: they must genuinely originate from the apparent author and their content must remain unaltered. Producing a screenshot does not itself settle either issue.
The judicial response to sexual violence allegations had to address vulnerability and context. The court highlighted prompt information gathering, checking surrounding circumstances and measures reducing victimisation during proceedings.
A coercion conviction was upheld: contractual uncertainty could not be settled unilaterally through violence or intimidation. Holding a right does not legitimise every means of enforcing it.
The court rejected treating the more serious scenario as established where the evidence was also compatible with a less incriminating alternative. Findings about awareness of risk required an adequate evidential basis.
The court reiterated that maintenance does not equalise wealth or salaries. It found an imbalance linked to years of family care, no independent income and limited opportunities to earn resources.
Privacy was central to criminal protection of the home. Entering another person’s dwelling without express or implied consent could satisfy the offence without a special ulterior purpose.
For the aggravated form examined, the emotional relationship had to extend beyond friendship. A two-and-a-half-year relationship with continuity, regularity and intended permanence met that standard on the facts.
A home-search warrant does not replace judicial authority to access devices. The decision must give reasons for access to and analysis of electronic material, either in the same authorisation or separately.
A breach conviction could not stand because the earlier acquittal had not expressly maintained the interim measure. A pending appeal did not replace the decision required to continue it.
An interview’s audio defect did not itself invalidate the evidence on the facts. The court heard the victim directly with an opportunity for challenge and did not base conviction on the inaudible material.
Spanish jurisdiction was examined on the established facts placing the child’s residence in Italy when non-return occurred. Reviewing jurisdiction was distinguished from re-determining the factual location on cassation.
Recording a conversation in which one participates does not itself breach communications secrecy. The court distinguished provocation, official investigation and interference with core privacy, which require separate analysis.
The court set aside a two-year limit because no circumstances justified departing from protection of the minor children’s housing. The judgment addresses the family home and genuinely available alternatives.
The Supreme Court rejected ending maintenance upon property liquidation without a sufficiently supported forecast that the imbalance would disappear. Age, lack of qualifications and long family dedication mattered.
The Constitutional Court upheld the rules governing contact where criminal proceedings or substantiated indications of violence exist. Their application requires judicial assessment and any statutory exception must be reasoned by reference to the child’s interests.
The Supreme Court upheld invalidation of a clause because abuse or psychological harm attributable to the granddaughters had not been proved. Estrangement could not create a new ground for removing their reserved share.
The court applied the reimbursement right to separate personal-injury compensation used to acquire community assets. Absence of an express reservation did not remove the statutory credit.
The approach recorded in the official study describes habitual violence as a climate of subjugation built through physical, verbal, psychological or sexual violence. Looking at the whole context helps assess continuing harm within the family.
The full court held that someone who had acted as a private prosecutor did not regain the testimonial exemption by later withdrawing. This changed the previous approach for the situation examined.
The Supreme Court included mortgage instalments imposed as an economic obligation in its article 227 Criminal Code analysis.
The court treated an unanswered call as completed communication where its origin could be identified. A conversation was unnecessary.
The full court distinguished making an asset community property from waiving reimbursement of separate funds. If their origin is proved, the contributor may have a credit despite making no express reservation at purchase.
The court upheld disinheritance where unjustified contempt and abandonment attributable to the children amounted to psychological abuse under its doctrine. The assessment could not be confined to whether insults occurred.
The Constitutional Court upheld the recording rules for a child’s interview in non-contentious proceedings. Privacy must be reconciled with disclosure of relevant procedural information and the opportunity to respond.
The court rejected a requirement for a specific purpose of humiliation for gender aggravation in the case examined. The proven conduct and discriminatory context mattered rather than the alternative explanation of a sexual motive.
The Supreme Court required rigorous proof that the children were principally and significantly responsible for the breakdown in contact. As that was not established, it rejected termination of maintenance on that ground.
The court held that the order’s specified measurement method applies; absent one, distance is measured in a straight line.
For the article 153 offence examined, the full court required no additional intention of domination beyond the offence’s elements.
The Supreme Court upheld termination of occupation upon liquidation of community property, finding that stable cohabitation with a new partner had changed the home’s family character. Alternatives for meeting the children’s housing needs also mattered.
The court highlighted the position of a person who directly suffered an assault when evaluating her account. That perspective helps understand the narrative without making testimony automatic proof or exempting it from scrutiny.
The court upheld a seven-year term because the appeal court had prudently explained the prospect of overcoming the imbalance, considering age, resources and employment possibilities. The time limit depended on that assessment rather than a preset duration.
The court rejected automatically extending restrictions on property transactions to the personal act of making a will. Actual ability when executing the will and the safeguards then applicable were decisive.
The full court accepted that precarious work in a family business may be treated like domestic work for compensation under article 1438 of the Civil Code.
A shared-custody arrangement was overturned because neither parent maintained a request for it. The child’s best interests do not by themselves remove the legal conditions for making that order.
The Constitutional Court set aside a return decision because it did not sufficiently assess the girl’s current integration after procedural delay. It required reasons effectively examining the circumstances relevant to her interests.
The Supreme Court allowed consideration of uninterrupted cohabitation preceding marriage when deciding spousal maintenance arising from the marital breakdown.
The doctrine recorded in the official summary distinguishes predictable, recurring educational expenses from unforeseen extraordinary ones. School-start expenses must be considered when calculating monthly maintenance contributions.
The Constitutional Court set aside contact arrangements that generically transferred a non-resident parent’s schedule to grandparents. Recognising the relationship did not remove the need to explain an appropriate scope and structure for those children.
The Supreme Court brought together the factors for assessing shared custody: previous care, parenting abilities, the child’s needs, reports and mutual respect. It treated this as a normal, desirable arrangement where feasible and beneficial.
The Constitutional Court struck down the requirement for a favourable prosecutor’s report before shared custody could be ordered without parental agreement. The court must decide the arrangement and explain its reasons.
The Supreme Court held that domestic-work compensation under separation of property does not require proof that the other spouse’s wealth increased. Its domestic-dedication doctrine must be read with later qualifications, including judgment 252/2017.
The Constitutional Court rejected the challenge to article 153.1 of the Criminal Code and found the differentiation examined compatible with equality. Its justification concerned the significance and harmfulness of that violence.
The Constitutional Court protected effective judicial relief in parentage proceedings: an unjustified refusal to cooperate with biological testing had to be assessed alongside other evidence. The daughter could not simply bear the evidential difficulty created by that refusal.